Toward Transatlantic Convergence in Financial Regulation
Hwa-Jin Kim* was signed into law on July 21, 2010. It will implement the sweeping financial reform that has been needed since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2007. One of the hottest issues discussed in the legislative traditional framework. They believed that the investment banking arms of the Swiss banks might neutralize the losses incurred by the housing loans. 6 This Article explores these questions while revisiting the universal banking system. As universal banking is the hallmark of the European financial services industry, Other countries will have their own reasons and political background to apply to their reform in the regulation of financial institutions and markets. The response made by foreign governments will in turn influence U.S.-banks' strategies in the global financial markets. Also, if states decide to keep the universal banking system in its traditional or modified form for strategic reasons, they will have to find alternative tools to make sure that their large financial institutions do not create excessive local, as well as global, systemic risk in the future. 7 Part II lays the groundwork for analysis and comparison with a discussion of the economics of universal banking and the reinstatement of the Glass-Steagall Act in the United States. Part III analyzes recent discussions for financial regulatory reform from a comparative perspective. It shows how the reform in the United States works on European infrastructures and highlights the practical differences. Germany and Switzerland will be the primary jurisdictions of interest. Part IV explores banks' corporate governance issues that search for solutions to this paper puts the U.S. system in comparative perspective with the European system. It takes a historical and political look at the regulation of financial institutions in the United States and Europe. Historical and political differences in these states can provide us with answers to how these countries approach the restructuring of their own, as well as the global, financial services industry. This Article also shows that the financial services industry in the United States and Europe share one thing in common which goes beyond their pathdependent limits: it is the pursuit of economies of scale and scope to effectively compete in global financial markets. As practices and strategies of financial institutions on both sides of the Atlantic converge toward each other, financial regulatory systems of the United States and Europe will do the same. the problems large universal banks pose to economies. It illuminates the role of good corporate governance for banks in financial regulatory reform. It also suggests that the rules and practice in corporate governance of banks in the United States and Europe are converging. Part V touches on the issues of global regulatory reform to see if the global solution might fit into the structural issues of financial institutions and systems. It emphasizes the need to develop international rules for the structure of financial institutions and importance of comparative financial system and regulation. It also briefly discusses the allocation of regulatory authority. Part VI concludes.
This Article reviews the historical background of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 along with the developments in the markets that led to the Gramm-LeachBliley Act of 1999. It analyzes the discussions on the Volcker Rule in the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 from a comparative perspective. It shows how the reform in the United States may impact financial institutions and markets in other jurisdictions. Germany and Switzerland, where universal banking is the hallmark of the financial services industry, are the primary jurisdictions of interest. After taking a historical and political look at the regulation of financial institutions in the United States and Europe, this Article touches on the issues of global regulatory reform to see if the global solution might fit into the structural issues of financial institutions and systems. Building on the discussions on convergence in bank corporate governance, it predicts transatlantic convergence in the financial system and structure of banking business preceded by convergence in the practices and strategies of financial institutions in the United States and Europe.
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A. The Issue
Controversy over the separation of commercial and investment banks has been active since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2007. In popular terms, the issue is whether the United States should reinstate the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. 9 The Act was passed after the Stock Market Crash of 1929 and the subsequent collapse of the American banking industry. The number of banks decreased from 25,000 to 14,000 during the crisis. The Act required the separation of commercial and investment banks in order to deter deposit-taking commercial banks from engaging in speculative and risky activities in the capital markets, which was believed to have been a major cause of the crash. It was not until 1999 when the Glass-Steagall Act was repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA). The failure of the financial institutions during the 2008 crisis cast doubts on the conventional wisdom of "size matters." Economies of scale and scope can be a good thing in the competitive market, but they also create the so-called "Too-BigTo-Fail" 12 problem. Commercial banks' activities related to capital markets have become too risky and arguably contributed to the collapse of the U.S. and global financial markets. Should the United States go back to the Glass-Steagall era? Clearly, America cannot afford another Lehman Brothers failure 13 or Citigroup bailout. The systemic risk created by large financial institutions has become too big to manage.
14 The complexity and magnitude of business of the leading financial institutions have become too great to handle for any first-class managers. 15 The repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act created big financial institutions in the United States. Desegregation of commercial and investment banking activities led to increased mergers and acquisitions in the financial services industry. Some of the largest among them have become too big to fail. Their businesses are too complicated for any software. The number of employees is so large that illegal or questionable practices can neither be detected nor easily controlled. The leading financial institutions went global without sufficient resources to handle cultural diversities within the organization. 16 Like Japanese mega-banks 17 they may be overwhelmed by their own size. 
Early Years
The modern banking business originated in Italy, representatively by the House of Medici in the 14 th century, preceded by Bardi and Peruzzi of Florence.
20
The Italian mathematician Fibonacci (c. 1170-c. 1250) came up with a new method of calculating interest, and that stimulated lending which in turn supported trade. 21 It is not coincidental that Shakespeare's The Merchant of Venice was about the merchants of the 14 th century. Soon, the rise of the merchant banks followed. 22 Merchant banks stayed in close relationship with industrial firms through trade finance, commercial papers and equity investments. The deposittaking commercial banks are the products and/or companions of these merchant banks. So, the universal bank can be said to not be a special category of bank; rather, it is the original form of doing banking business, with the only exception being in England where banks took almost no equity participation in industrial firms.
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Baring Bank is said to be the oldest significant merchant bank in history. 24 control. As a result, the global financial crisis brought their economies down. James, supra note __. After the Civil War, the early investment bankers began to underwrite U.S. railroad stocks to finance the huge industry. They then began to buy and distribute the stocks to European investors.
It was founded in England in
Like Baring, Rothschild also grew through financing activities for dynasties and sovereign governments, particular during times of war. It was the absolute financial power through the 19 th century. More importantly, it practically midwifed the investment banking industry in the United States through its agents, most notably August Belmont, who sold railroad bonds issued by the U.S. firms in Europe. 27 This was when the American model of investment banking emerged. 
J.P. Moragn and the Glass-Steagall
John Coffee suggested that investment bankers took the role of guardians for public investors in the early stages of industrialization in the United States. 30 When we read Edward Rock's fascinating description of the age of robber barons, 31 it makes perfect sense that American investors badly needed investment bankers. Railroad companies did not protect minority shareholders through corporate governance devices. To the contrary, control group quite often manipulated stock prices. Through corporate governance mechanisms, investment banks devised a way to credibly make promises to potential investors. For instance, they had directorships in many banks and general corporations to monitor managers and businesses. 32 However, the investment banking industry led by J.P. Morgan was soon feared by the public as it grew too fast and powerful. 33 J.P. Morgan controlled the entire financial services industry of the time, banking, securities and insurance included. The financial firms in turn controlled industrial firms. The Pujo Committee was created in 1912, and the industry was ultimately reorganized by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. 34 Commercial banking and investment banking were separated for very political reasons. 35 President Theodore Roosevelt's antagonism against the financial industry symbolized by J.P. Morgan played a crucial role in the process. 36 Americans feared that the financial giant may jeopardize democracy. 37 Trust, Morgan Stanley, 38 and Morgan Grenfell of London. However, it is not clear if universal banking contributed to the failure of banks during the Great Depression. The U.S. system did not allow banks to do business outside of the place of their establishment because of the public sentiment that local money should go to local borrowers.
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The Glass-Steagall Act experienced continuous erosion in its normative power over the years. The U.S. banking industry regarded the Act as a roadblock in its fierce competition with the European universal banks in the global financial markets that were characterized by world-wide mergers and acquisitions.
That prevented American banks from growing large and small banks were inherently vulnerable to economic crisis. 40 The economies of scope could not be achieved because of the Act. At the same time, investment banks started to eat away at the traditional businesses of commercial banks. Junk bonds replaced commercial loans in the 1980s 41 due to the rapid growth of private equity and leveraged buyouts. The growth of the mutual fund market was also a huge blow to commercial banks' lending business. So, banks became offensive and expanded their business into the capital markets, challenging the Glass-Steagall Act. Most notably, banks began securities brokerage and asset management services. Litigation followed. Voluminous case law and practice were developed in this area. 
3.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley and Industry Consolidation
The 1998 the merger of Citicorp and Travelers highlighted the trend. 45 Citigroup, the largest financial services company in the world, was created through the stock swap merger of Travelers (which owned SalomonSmithBarney) and Citicorp, the parent of Citibank. Finally, in 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was passed and partially repealed the Glass-Steagall Act with the backing of Alan Greenspan and the Clinton administration. The GLBA allowed commercial banks to engage in the securities and insurance businesses.
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Since the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, commercial banks have aggressively pursued the highly profitable investment banking business. Commercial banks cited the following reasons for pursuing new fee-based businesses: first, they felt compelled to offer one-stop shopping for existing clientele; second, it was regarded as a necessary step to compete with European universal banks not restrained by regulations; third, cross-selling platforms appeared attractive; fourth, apparent cost savings were available through leveraging the existing client and industry knowledge base; and fifth, as competition intensified, they could provide credit to win capital markets business. 47 On the side of investment banking business, spreads narrowed and, accordingly, economies of scale increased. Computers and information technologies became increasingly powerful and sophisticated, specialized investment banking houses badly needed capital to operate at a commercial scale. Some of them were absorbed by commercial banks. Only a couple of industry leaders remain solely focused on investment banking. Universal banks appear to be better positioned given their size and access to capital; however, such pure investment banks like Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers have maintained their market share since 1996. Universal banks like Citigroup and J.P. Morgan Chase experienced difficulty in integrating and aligning banking, sales and trading, and research. Pure investment banks were also well capitalized and were not handicapped for lack of capital (i.e. block trades) because most of them went public, 49 and credit relationships both helped and hurt.
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C.
Reinstatement of the Glass-Steagall Act?
Much has been written on the global financial crisis. This is not the place to repeat it. The financial crisis of 2008 occurred when banks and other financial institutions took huge risks. Several of the world's oldest and largest financial institutions collapsed or were on the verge of doing so. Government bailouts followed, but markets plummeted and credit dried up. The whole financial system was led to near collapse. Financial products like credit default swaps and other financial derivatives became the target of public outrage. The crisis ignited discussions on the business model of financial services firms as it relates to the soundness of the financial system and the safety of the entire economy. As the crisis was international in nature, discussions have been made worldwide through international stages like the G20.
Pros
Many blame the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act as one factor leading to the financial crisis. 52 They believe that allowing commercial and investment banks to combine led to the current crisis, and that re-mandating separation would prevent a repeat of the financial crisis. 53 Allowing commercial banks to engage in risky capital market related activities, while protecting them from failure through deposit insurance and access to the Federal Reserve Bank's discount window, created a moral hazard problem 54 and an appetite for larger risks. Therefore, "some kind of separation between institutions that deal primarily in the capital markets and those involved in more traditional deposit-taking and working-capital finance makes sense." 55 Another argument in favor of reinstating the Glass-Steagall Act is that conflicts of interest may become more serious when commercial and investment banking activities are consolidated into a single financial institution, 56 considering that conflicts of interest is by far the single most important issue for big investment banks. to control successfully. There are many empirical studies that support the conflicts of interest concern. 58 Also, segregation of commercial and investment banking activities may be the way to address behavioral factors that can lead to global financial chaos. It is argued that segregation is the only way to prevent socio-psychological aspects of market behavior from leading to homogenization in global financial markets.
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Segregating financial institutions along business lines would prevent homogenization of financial markets on an international level, and thus reduce the potential for a local financial crisis to grow into a global one. 
Cons
Conventional wisdom is that universal banks can provide consumers with a greater range of services and tend to have greater capital reserves to protect consumers against unanticipated losses. The universal banking structure provides economies of scale and scope to banks that enable them to offer services to customers at a lower price. 61 It creates synergies as the use of deposits as a cheap source of funds may be employed across the border of the commercial banking business. Capital Markets Regulation 63 and Paul Krugman, 64 argue against regulation that newly requires the separation of commercial and investment banking. It has been strongly suggested that there is no connection between the failure of universal banking and the financial crisis. The U.S. banks failed due to the deterioration of their commercial banking businesses. Reinstating the Glass-Steagall divide would be unnecessary for financial reform because repeal of the Act neither caused nor worsened the financial crisis.
65 After all, it was the bad lending practices and the subprime mortgage business, the core of commercial banking, that served as the primary causes of the financial crisis.
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Although the Glass-Steagall Act Regulations must therefore target bad lending practices that lie at the root of the financial crisis. 67 prohibited commercial banks from underwriting or dealing in mortgage-backed securities (MBS), the Act never prohibited commercial banks from buying and selling MBS as investment securities.
68 Thus, banks suffered losses from acting in their capacity as commercial banks, not from acting as securities firms. GLBA simply permitted securities firms and commercial banks to be affiliated with each other. It is unlikely that a bank securities affiliate or subsidiary of a commercial bank could significantly harm the financial condition of the commercial bank. 69 To be sure, the expansion of commercial banks' business areas over the years was also made possible through market practices and permissive policies of the administration and judiciary while the Glass-Steagall Act was still in force. Therefore, it may well be argued that the differences in detail between the Glass-Steagall and GLBA 68 Wallison, supra note 4, at 6. 69 Id. at 16-17. 70 For a good summary, see Ofer, supra note __, at 543-50. services industry may have taken advantage of the changes. In practice, 100 percent-owned subsidiaries may be run as business units within one firm.
The conflicts of interest problem with universal banking may have been exaggerated, and can be controlled through proper regulatory measures. 71 One study shows that the conflicts of interest issue that was controversial at the time of the enactment of Glass-Steagall was in fact exaggerated. 72 It goes further and argues that the universal banking system was more effective in controlling the conflicts of interest because of the sensitivity of universal banks' reputation.
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Opponents of reinstating Glass-Steagall propose such alternative forms of financial regulation to further financial reform as limiting the amount of assets a single financial institution may hold and to increase capital requirements of financial institutions. Regulation should also focus on banks' risk-taking activity, not on the size, and should mandate higher capital requirements relative to risktaking activity and impose limits on leverage ratios. 74 Canada is a good example of that approach. Proponents of universal banking, i.e., opponents of reinstating Glass-Steagall, highlight Canada as evidence that universal banking does not have inherent structural weaknesses and would not necessarily lead to financial crisis. Canada adopts the universal banking model, and Canada's banking industry is dominated by five large banks that represent ninety percent of the market. 75 However, no Canadian bank failed during the global financial crisis. This can be attributed to alternative forms of regulation, including tighter lending standards, lower leverage ratios, and better regulatory oversight.
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D.
The Volcker-Rule
A Compromise
Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act is also known as the Merkley-Levin provisions on proprietary trading and conflicts of interest or simply as the "Volcker Rule." It adds a new Section 13 to the Bank Holding Company Act of 72 Id. at 43-122. 73 Id. at 205-11. 74 Big Banks Needn't Be Bad Banks, ECON. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2010), http://economictimes. indiatimes.com/news/international-business/big-banks-neednt-be-badbanks/articleshow/5536770.cms. 75 Id. 76 
Id.
77 See generally, Andrew F. Tuch, Conflicted Gatekeepers: The Volcer Rule and Goldman 1956. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker believed that commercial banks' risk-taking activities needed to be constrained. He had been arguing that commercial banks should be prevented from taking advantage of the safety net provided by the government to make speculative investments. 78 Volcker proposed a new financial reform, which restores the "spirit" of the Glass-Steagall Act, but not the Act itself.
79 President Obama endorsed this reform and named it the "Volcker Rule." Rather than recreating a wall between commercial and investment banking, the Volcker Rule forbids commercial banks from owning or investing in hedge funds, private equity funds, and from engaging in proprietary trading. 80 According to Simon Johnson, "[m]ismanagement of risks that involved effectively betting the banks' own capital was central to the financial crisis of 2008." 81 The Volcker Rule would "significantly reduce systemic financial risks looking forward." Furthermore, the "separation between banks and the funds they sponsor, in any fashion, needs to be complete." guarantees to firms that operate banks. We do so because a stable and reliable banking system promotes sustained growth, and because we learned how dangerous the failure of that system can be during the Great Depression. But these privileges were not created to bestow banks operating hedge funds or private equity funds with an unfair advantage. When banks benefit from the safety net that taxpayers provide --which includes lower-cost capital --it is not appropriate for them to turn around and use that cheap money to trade for profit. And that is especially true when this kind of trading often puts banks in direct conflict with their customers' interests. The fact is, these kinds of trading operations can create enormous and costly risks, endangering the entire bank if things go wrong. We simply cannot accept a system in which hedge funds or private equity firms inside banks can place huge, risky bets that are subsidized by taxpayers and that could pose a conflict of interest. And we cannot accept a system in which shareholders make money on these operations if the bank wins but taxpayers foot the bill if the bank loses." 83 The Volcker Rule requires that large banks cease to conduct proprietary trading and significantly limit their private-fund investments to three percent of the Basel II Tier 1 capital. The original version of the Rule stipulated a total ban on commercial banks' private-fund investments. Banks have at maximum a seven-year grace period to comply with the Rule. Commercial banks can do certain derivative businesses only through their subsidiaries although this is not included in the Volcker Rule. 84 As for the restructuring of the financial services industry, President Obama articulated the thinking behind a rule that limits the size of single financial institution:
"[A]s part of our efforts to protect against future crises, I'm also proposing that we prevent the further consolidation of our financial system. There has long been a deposit cap in place to guard against too much risk being concentrated in a single bank. The same principle should apply to wider forms of funding employed by large financial institutions in today's economy. The American people will not be served 83 See supra note 2. by a financial system that comprises just a few massive firms. That's not good for consumers; it's not good for the economy. And through this policy, that is an outcome we will avoid." 85 The Volcker Rule includes the measures that curb the size of banks.
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Mergers and acquisitions amongst banks will be allowed only to the extent that combined liabilities did not exceed ten percent of the entire liabilities of all banks. This rule in fact may raise concern outside the United States in terms of mergers and acquisitions. 87 However, most mergers and acquisitions would not surpass the rule. 
International Reach
The Volcker Rule covers both U.S. banking groups and non-U.S. banking groups with U.S. banking operations. 89 The rule applies to "banking entities." A banking entity includes any company that is treated as a bank holding company for purposes of Section 8 of the International Banking Act of 1978 and any subsidiary or affiliate of that entity, e.g., foreign banks with U.S.-based branches and agencies. Accordingly, the rule affects virtually every major commercial and investment bank worldwide. 90 To be sure, as there is no ability for a U.S. institution to shift business abroad to avoid the rule, foreign institutions might enjoy an advantage if they do business solely outside the United States. Alan Greenspan also has recently pointed out that U.S. offices of foreign institutions could readily switch proprietary trading to European and Asian, even Canadian banks.
92 Also, non-U.S. financial institutions covered by the Volcker Rule would generally be allowed to continue making investments and conduct private equity and hedge fund operations outside the United States if they are not controlled by a U.S. institution and do not sell ownership interest in the private equity or hedge fund to a U.S. resident. 93 However, any significant non-U.S. financial institution has business interests in one way or another within the United States. Therefore, the Volcker Rule would have greater impact on the businesses of non-U.S. financial institutions than the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 did on the corporate governance of non-U.S. firms. Non-U.S. firms listed on a U.S. stock exchange are exempt from many, though not all, of the corporate governance requirements under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, provided that they disclose the differences between their home country corporate governance practices compared to those applicable to U.S. companies.
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III. UNIVERSAL BANKING IN EUROPE
Such exemptions may not be available under the Dodd-Frank Act because it is not about foreign securities listed on a U.S. stock exchange, but about doing actual business in the United States.
In the United States, the basic institutional framework established by the GLBA that allows universal banking will remain valid notwithstanding the new constraints introduced by the Volcker-Rule. The U.S. financial institutions will keep moving toward universal banking to achieve economies of scale and scope as soon as the restructuring of the financial services industry becomes complete. The discussions below put the developments in the United States in comparative perspective with the European system.
A.
A European Volcker-Rule?
When the U.S. plan, including the Volcker Rule, was first publicized in early 2010, European Union finance ministers opposed the U.S. proposal to limit banks' size and risk-taking. The Volcker Rule in the European Union might not be consistent with the current principles of the internal market and universal banking. The Credit Institutions Directive of 2000 clearly adopted the universal 93 For detailed discussions, see CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note __ and Sabel, supra note __. 94 See, e.g., SEC Rule 10A-3(b)(iv), 10A-3(c). 96 In particular, the British Financial Services Minister Paul Myners suggested that he would prefer a capital requirement approach like the Basel Committee rules to the structural changes proposed by the United States to address risky bank trading activities. Curbing the size of big banks was not the best way to make the system safer. 97 Germany and France also signaled that they would not follow the U.S. guidelines, raising concerns about banks coming to Europe to conduct their risky activities.
98 If European banks were to be broken up or if their universal banking system was to be abandoned, they would be needlessly squandering one of their strengths. The European countries do not pay great attention to the Volker Rule's restraints on commercial banks' hedge fund and private equity investments because of the insignificant volume of businesses in those areas.
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On the other hand, the European Parliament adopted new rules for hedge funds and private equity in November 2010. 100 to control the behavior of major banks. See Johnson, supra note __, at __.
The directive does not specifically govern banks' hedge funds and private equity-related activities. It generally regulates those industries. Under the new rules, capital and disclosure requirements will be imposed on fund managers across the European Union. Managers will have to comply with such rules as covering, depositary arrangements, and pay and capital distributions. From January 2013, approved fund managers will be allowed to market their funds across the EU with the EU Passport, rather than continue to seek approval on a member country-by-member country basis. The EU Passport may be extended also to fund managers outside the member countries, including those in the United States, from 2015. Put these developments together with the Volcker Rule, and the U.S. banks may be a little 
110 After World War II, it was divided into ten local banks and it was not until 1957 when it was reinstated in Frankfurt. Deutsche Bank has been a universal bank since its establishment. But, its character has been a commercial bank largely due to the nature of a bank-centered German economy. Germany has been a bank-centered economy with less-developed capital markets.
112 Therefore, German banks, although being universal banks, have been commercial banks in nature. However, things have changed since the 1980s due to the integration of capital markets from around the world and the economic integration of Europe. German banks have been trying to develop investment banking businesses, Deutsche Bank being the most notable example. The number of mergers and acquisitions amongst banks has also been increasing. 113 German industrial firms have historically been under the practical control of German banks. It was understood as the secret of success and competition of the German economy. The German system was seriously studied by American scholars until at least the 1990s. 114 However, the ownership of industrial firms by the banks was an obstacle for German banks in their strategy to develop investment banking businesses. Through the German banking industry's request, the German government enacted legislation (Steuersenkungsgesetz) in July 2000 to waive capital gains tax for German banks' disposal of shares in industrial firms. 115 One of the strengths of universal banking is that the ownership in industrial firms gives access to corporate information. This, however, became unimportant in the age of mandatory disclosure, financial transparency and digital information 116 ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, May 11, 2002, at 15 (Ger.). while conflicts of interest remained. 112 Industrial firms finance largely through commercial loans in a bank-centered economy. Loans are extended on a face-to-face basis. In crisis, parties talk, negotiate, and find solutions. On the contrary, in a capital markets-centered economy, parties do not know who the counterparties are. Firms finance through liquid securities and securitizations. In crisis, it is very difficult to find solutions through communications. 113 (1993) . One study found that "firm performance improved to the extent that equity control rights are concentrated." And, "bank control rights from equity ownership significantly improved firm performance beyond what nonbank block-holders can achieve." Banks did not extract private value to the detriment of firm performance -German banks did not seek rent. It diagnoses that "perhaps this explains the German success despite of the ownership concentration." Ownership concentration in the hands of financial institutions (not individuals or families) may not be that bad. The U.S. decision for weak banks might have been wrong after all. According to this research, "there was no evidence of conflicts of interest between banks and other shareholders. 
Switzerland
The banking industry in Switzerland was created in the 14 th century in the Geneva area. By the end of the 18 th century, Switzerland became one of the international financial power houses of Europe. The neutrality of Switzerland made it possible to avoid involvement in wars and other armed conflicts. Ever since the Vienna Conference of 1815, Switzerland has maintained neutrality. Though it became a member of the United Nations in 2002, Switzerland has not joined the European Union. The neutrality of Switzerland was well preserved even during World War II. 117 Its geopolitical stability attracted capital from around the world. 118 This has been made possible partly because Switzerland maintained strong armed forces. 119 Mark Roe points out that Switzerland's financial markets are unlike those in other civil law jurisdiction as by 1999, Swiss stock market capitalization as a fraction of its GNP exceeded that of the UK and the United States, and Switzerland was not occupied in the 20 th century. 120 With no deficits, Switzerland became an exporter of capital. The major importer of Swiss money was French aristocrats and monarchs. This contributed to the development of the Geneva area.
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When the Glass-Steagall Act was enacted in the United States, Switzerland followed the U.S. model, along with Belgium, Italy and Sweden. Commercial banking and investment banking remained separated until the 1960s in Switzerland.
When the wave of the industrial revolution reached Switzerland in 1850, big banks emerged in the country to finance the railroads. In the 1890s, power and tourist industries took off, creating more big banks. 
Germany
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In Germany, specialized and local banks, not the large national banks, were hit first by the global financial crisis. In 2007, IKB (IKB Deutsche Industriebank) was bailed out by receiving government money in the amount of 1.8 billion Euros and issuing convertible bonds and shares to KfW. KfW ended up owning ninety percent of IKB at the end of the day before it sold IKB shares to Lone Star, the Texas-based private equity firm, for 600 million Euros in October 2008, losing more than eight billion Euros. IKB had invested heavily in structured securities through taking excessive leverage and short-term financing since 2001. Hypo Real Estate Holding (HRE) was next to get into trouble. By the end of 2007, HRE's assets amounted to 400 billion Euros with heavy investments in CDOs related to the U.S. sub-prime mortgage market. HRE's Irish subsidiary, the Irish Depfa Bank, could not continue to refinance its long-term assets. By September of 2008, it became clear that HRE's failure could ruin Germany's whole banking system. A bailout package in the amount of fifty billion Euros was arranged which increased to 100 billion Euros thereafter. It also turned out that the European financial supervisory system had cracks. As an Irish-licensed bank, Depfa was not subject to the direct supervision of BaFin, the German financial supervisory authority. In 2008, WestLB recorded trading losses of 600 million Euros in 2007 and transferred bad assets worth twenty-three billion Euros to a special investment vehicle to remove them from its balance sheet. Again in October 2009, WestLB's troubled assets with a nominal value of seventy-seven billion Euros were transferred into a bad bank for liquidation. HSH Nordbank (HSH) ended up possessing seventeen billion Euros of troubled real estate assets. It received a government guarantee worth thirty billion Euros. Some other Landesbanken followed suit. To convince the depositors that the commercial banking part of the universal bank would not automatically respond to the emergency support from the securities business part, a universal bank must be well equipped with a separation system. It is not an easy task, though. For that reason, German universal banks need to slowly develop the structure of a financial holding or group 130
Switzerland
as the UK banks did.
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In Switzerland, banks dwarf the rest of the economy. This small country with some eight million people houses more than 200 banks.
132 UBS and Credit Suisse each have assets of more than one trillion Swiss Francs (USD900 billion), twice the size of the Swiss economy. 132 According to data from 1994, the ratio of those employed in banking to the total number of employed was 3.14% in Switzerland, compared to 2.07% in Germany, 1.21% in the United States, and 0.64% in Japan. See BUSCH, supra note __, at 164. parliament has been discussing the implementation of those recommendations. The banks are required to draw up plans to separate units that are important for the country from businesses that would be allowed to fail in a crisis. Swiss regulators also gave UBS and Credit Suisse four years to raise their risk-weighted capital to as much as double the Basel II requirements. The Swiss regulators are seeking more power to break the two giants up before they collapse. 136 Should another crisis erupt, the government will allow the banks to fail. However, the panel will not further consider banning proprietary trading and has dropped proposals to break up the lenders. 137 Thus far, the Volcker Rule has not found support in Switzerland. 
3.
A Note on the United Kingdom
139
During the financial crisis, the UK government bailed out banks with a combined balance sheet of more than two times the UK GDP, which was around USD2.7 trillion at the end of 2008. 140 As a result, the UK government now owns some eighty-three percent of the Royal Bank of Scotland Group, 100 percent of Northern Rock, etc. 141 There is opinion in the UK that favors functional separation of financial services architecture. It emphasizes "narrow banking," i.e., tight restriction of the scope and activities of commercial banks. considers separating commercial banking and investment banking 143 although it is not certain if such a plan could be implemented. The Independent Commission on Banking, created on June 16, 2010 to consider structural and related nonstructural reforms to the UK banking sector, has been looking at separation of retail and investment banking, limits on proprietary trading and investing, and measures to reduce market concentration. 144 John Vickers, Chairman of the Commission, recently ruled out ideas for narrow banking. But he explored the idea that universal banks might be required to ring-fence certain riskier operations from their consumer businesses. According to him universal banking had the disadvantage that unsuccessful investment banking may bring down the whole bank, including the commercial banking arm. Although he indicated that the riskier operations of banks could be required to hold more capital rather than being split off from the bank completely, he rejected the characterization of investment banking operations as "casinos." 145 As mentioned before, the British system has traditionally been characterized by independent developments of each financial services sector. This was so even though the UK did not have any regulation on the delimitation of financial services. However, the so-called Big Bang of 1987 stimulated the creation of universal banks in the United Kingdom. As the UK universal banks adopted the subsidiaries model, not the in-house model, the Bank of England did not see large contagion risk involved in the universal banking system. 146 Also, the Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 introduced sophisticated Chinese wall requirements to regulate the conflicts of interest within the financial group.
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D. Exkurs: East Asia
Japan requires the separation of commercial and investment banks as the U.S. occupation authority put the U.S. system in place in Japan after World War II.
148 143 See SCOTT, supra note __, at 108. However, the Japanese commercial banks have been engaged in securities 144 Randell, supra note __, at 7. 148 BENSTON, supra note __, at 2. underwriting since 1993. 149 It is reported that Japanese commercial bank's securities underwriting benefits the issuer. 150 Japanese commercial banks are also permitted to trade commercial papers. China requires segregation, too. 151 Commercial bank deposits are the largest financial assets in China and its weight is relatively heavier than that of other countries. As far as the investment banking business is concerned, global houses like Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley currently dominate the Chinese market. The global investment banking houses lead the privatization of State-Owned Chinese firms, investing in Chinese commercial banks at the same time. 152 Korea has a plan for moving toward the universal banking system. The Korean government also has plans for the so-called 'megabank' that can be created through mega mergers amongst top commercial banks. The whole idea is that Korean banks are 'too small to succeed' in the global market.
Thus far, Japan and China have not shown great interest in the regulatory developments in the United States, including the Volcker-Rule. 
IV. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF UNIVERSAL BANKS
After the financial crisis, bank corporate governance has become a hot issue. In particular, risk management and bank managers' pay are the focus of discussion. 156 Since the 1990s, the corporate governance and finance scholarships have produced much about legal origin and corporate governance.
The corporate governance of banks is not directly related to the business structure of universal banks. However, the size and complexity of a financial institution may have impact on its corporate governance and vice versa. As seen above, the European countries basically want to keep the conventional universal banking system although they did witness problems inherent to the large and complex financial institutions. This would make corporate governance of universal banks a more significant issue than it was before. If they do not want to adopt the structural approach, prudential rule and corporate governance would be the alternatives. discussions below, however, focus on the corporate governance of banks, not the banks' role in corporate governance. Despite its importance, research on the corporate governance of banks and bank directors' liabilities has been relatively rare. 159 The global financial crisis has stimulated discussions on bank corporate governance in the United States as well as in Europe.
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A.
Risk Management
Director's Fiduciary Duty to Manage Risks
Many claim that one of the causes of the global financial crisis is the poor corporate governance of banks and other financial institutions. 161 Bank managers were not prudent and the board of directors of banks did not prevent risky lending practices. 162 Banks' internal control system did not function properly. Bank managers' risk appetite was too big, and they regularly ignored risk officers' warnings, with Goldman Sachs and BNP Paribas 163 being exceptions. Part of the bank managers' aggressive attitude to risks can be attributed to their compensation system. 164 31 countries, concludes that the higher the ownership of institutional investors and the ratios of bonuses in CEO compensation package, the higher was the tendency of risk taking. 165 Banks are at the risk center. 166 A bank's business centers on taking risks. 167 The board of directors of banks determines the risk tolerance and the risk appetite of the bank, and develops business strategies based on that decision. Therefore, risk management is at the core of a bank manager's duty. 168 The severity of the 2008 financial crisis was very much about how big banks' managers acquired and mismanaged huge risks 169 and in the process damaged the rest of the financial market and industry, and the broader economy. 170 Banks should construct corporate governance in a way that could maximize the value of the bank as a business organization and, at the same time, minimize the systemic risk. 171 If banks' managers took on excessive risk, they may have benefited the shareholders short-term, but harmed the shareholders in the long run through having externalized the costs to the system. 172 of directors of banks were not supposed to minimize the agency costs, but serve a public purpose such as stabilizing financial markets and politics. 173 John Coffee is skeptical about empowering bank shareholders because the shareholders' incentives might be to take greater risk through increasing bank's leverage. 174 The European Commission's Green Paper of June 2, 2010 questions whether shareholder control of financial institutions is still realistic. 175 At this point, the entire discussion on the stakeholder model and sustainability comes back to life. 
Germany and Switzerland
In 1998, Germany amended the Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz) to introduce the director's duty to manage enterprise risk.
177 Article 91, Section 2 of the Aktiengesetz provides that the management board shall take suitable measures, in particular surveillance measures, to ensure that developments threatening the continuation of the company are detected early. 178 enterprise.
179 Article 25a, Section 1 of the German Banking Act (Gesetz über das Kreditwesen -KWG) provides that an institution bank must have in place suitable arrangements for managing, monitoring and controlling risks and appropriate arrangements by means of which the institution's financial situation can be gauged with sufficient accuracy at all times. It also provides that an institution must have a proper business organization, an appropriate internal control system, and adequate security precautions for the deployment of electronic data processing. 180 Recently, the German Law on Modernization of Corporate Accounting (BilMoG) has introduced the concept of risk management into the German Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch -HGB) and Aktiengesetz. 181 It is interesting to see that the BaFin developed special rules for financial services firms that link the compensation issue to risk management. In August 2009, it published an updated version of the Minimum Requirements for Risk Management (Mindestanforderungen an das Risikomanagement). The rule requires financial institutions to maintain an appropriate risk management system pursuant to Paragraph 25 of the KWG, and then Section 71 of the rule addresses the parameters of incentive systems for bank staff. According to that, incentive systems must be harmonized with the general strategic targets of the bank. In particular, compensation systems must be designed so as not to encourage bank managers to take inappropriate levels of risks. Back office people, in particular those involved in risk control, have to also be compensated in a way that appropriately reflects their responsibilities.
It remains to be seen how the regulatory developments will lead to better risk management in German universal banks.
Swiss law also recognizes the directors' duty to carry out risk assessment and risk management. They are obliged to define the company's risk appetite and tolerance and monitor possible risks. A director's duty to manage risks was introduced in Article 663b of the Swiss Code of Obligations in 2008 although scholars regarded such a duty as given under Article 716a, Paragraph 1 of the Code. The German IKB's former CEO currently stands trial for having misled shareholders and having breached fiduciary duties. He has been accused of not having properly managed risks involved in new financial products and economic developments. It is expected that the legal controversy over the scope of the business judgment rule will take place in terms of the management of the financial institution.
184 Germany formally introduced the business judgment rule in Article 93, Paragraph 1 of Aktiengesetz in 2005.
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A bank director can sign a risky contract with a third party on behalf of the bank by considering the interests of the firm. In such a case, whether it should be deemed as the director's neglect of duty towards the corporation is not easy to answer at a glance. That is because it may be viewed as a breach of neither laws and regulations nor the articles of incorporation. Nevertheless, signing a risky contract may expose the corporation to the possibility of insolvency so as to deal a blow in achieving the company's business objectives while affecting the reliance on the company placed by its interested parties such as its shareholders, officers and employees. From the perspective that a company does not exist solely for the purpose of seeking the financial interests of its shareholders, but is a social being that should be sustainable, company as well as to all of its interested parties even though it is in the shortterm interest of shareholders. As banks create systemic risks, the sustainability consideration is more compelling to bank directors. 187 The level of a director's fiduciary duty owed to the corporation very much depends upon the size and business area of the corporation. The rule can be best understood in terms of bank director liability. Banks are required to contribute to the stability of the financial markets and to the development of the national economy. Therefore, for instance, the Korean Supreme Court once ruled that bank directors must fulfill their fiduciary duties with utmost (enhanced) care.
188 Swiss law also recognizes higher levels of duty owed by the directors' of financial institutions. 189 The conventional protection provided by the business judgment rule may be weaker for bank directors. Such fiduciary duties include the duty to properly manage risks as discussed above. By violating the duty to manage risks, bank director can be held liable to the bank and/or shareholders, depending upon the jurisdiction. 190 The bank director may breach the fiduciary duty to the bank even when the director acted in the short-term interest of the bank if the act exposed the bank to higher enterprise risk and caused the bank to be responsible for the increase of systemic risk.
191
B.
Bankers' Pay 189 See Kunz, supra note __, at 132. 190 Under Article 401 of the Korean Commercial Code, a director may be held jointly and severally liable to third parties for any damages incurred by such third parties resulting in the failure of such director to perform his or her duties, either willfully or by gross negligence. This provision is unique in that it holds directors liable to third parties for breach of their fiduciary duties owed to their own corporation. Third parties regularly incur losses due to corporation's breach of their contract. Therefore, it is puzzling and hard to understand why directors who decided to breach a third-party contract for the benefit their corporation and shareholders got held liable to third parties. The Korean Supreme Court and other Korean courts have had a difficult line-drawing problem and had to identify the circumstances where breach of a third-party contract done for the benefit of the company constitutes director's breach of fiduciary duty to the company. How to regulate the bankers' compensation has been a hot issue since the outbreak of the financial crisis. It is now well known that compensation arrangements in the investment banking industry arguably 192 motivated excessive risk taking. 193 The problem is, however, that no matter how the bonus arrangements were made, it was not to serve the shareholders' interest. Most pay and bonus arrangements were linked to the actual performance of bank managers. 194 Therefore, private ordering may not solve the problem satisfactorily. Rather, government's direct intervention will do the job. The Dodd-Frank Act addresses the issue by requiring shareholders' non-binding resolution for CEO compensation and the golden parachute ('say on pay') 195 European countries have also introduced the regulation on bankers' pay by promulgating guidelines. Under huge political pressure, banks in the UK, Germany and France moved to limit bonuses in 2009. In 2010, the European Union enacted legislation to force European banks to curb excessive pay to bankers. modeled after the UK's shareholder advisory vote on directors' compensation. The SEC has the authority to waive the requirement. Firms are required to set up a compensation committee with independent directors for that matter. Financial institutions with assets in excess of one billion dollars shall disclose compensation arrangement including performance-linked bonuses. 196 thirty percent of their bonus in cash starting in 2011, and risk losing some of the remainder should the bank's performance erode. Banks that do not fully comply with the rule will have to set aside more capital to make up for the risk. If national regulators determine that a bank's compensation structure encourages risk, they can force the bank to place hundreds of millions of Euros more in its capital cushion as insurance. Banks that received government bailout funds would also have to justify the compensation of their managers to the governments. 197 Switzerland, not a member of the European Union, has also introduced limits on banker's pay. 198 In the UK, the Financial Services Authority issued the final form of the revised Remuneration Code on December 17, 2010. The Code introduces significant restrictions on the way in which remuneration policies and structures are operated within financial institutions in the UK and beyond. 199 The Code builds upon international standards set by the Financial Stability Board at a European level and goes beyond those standards in a number of key respects. 200 Germany enacted the Law on the Appropriateness of Board Member Compensation (Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung -VorstAG). Under the VorstAG, the total compensation for executives must reflect both the duties and responsibilities owed by them as well as the overall financial situation of the company. The compensation contract must allow the downsizing of the compensation package in case the financial situation of the company deteriorates. The supervisory board members may be held liable if they determined an inappropriate compensation package for an executive. The annual general shareholders' meeting is entitled to approve the compensation package.
The Code, among others, subscribes to the principle of proportionality.
Executive compensation, including bankers' pay, has been a big issue also in Switzerland. 201 Upon a citizen's initiative (the "Abzocker-Initiative"), there is going to be a national vote on the amendment of Swiss Federal Constitution.
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The initiative covers a lot of ground, including proposal against rip-off salaries. It may not be understood as being designed solely for shareholder value, but it may also target some social goals. 203 The text of the initiative actually states that it was made "[t]o protect the economy, private property and the shareholders and in the spirit of sustainable corporate management." 204 Amongst top Swiss banks, Credit Suisse seems to lead taking move on bonuses, 205 whereas the UBS rather balks.
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C. The Role of the State in the Corporate Governance of Banks
Government is neither the owner of big businesses nor their financier. However, government involvement in the corporate governance of private companies has been increasing recently for various reasons. The failure of any of a few very large corporations, including financial institutions, can take down a big part of the economic system. It may also have adverse impacts on the job markets which are politically sensitive. Government arranges acquisitions, sometimes providing the bailout funds to facilitate the deal. For strategically crucial companies, government acts as the guardian against foreign capital as was exemplified in the Unocal and Dubai Ports World 208 cases. The concept of national security 209 is being replaced by the concept of systemic importance. The global financial crisis has called some old principles into question. For the first time in its history, the U.S. government holds major ownership stakes in large companies and financial institutions and is playing an increasingly active role in their governance. 210 The role of government has traditionally been important in the financial services industry. As there are such stakeholders for commercial banks as depositors and deposit insurance institutions, government has reasons to get involved in the corporate governance of commercial banks. 211 In emerging jurisdictions, large banks have mostly been privatized recently. Their government and banks are therefore in the shadow of a still fresh memory of the past. The role of the state has become even more significant after the financial crisis as many large banks in the United States and Europe were bailed out by the governments. Although governments now hold a dominant position in the corporate governance of banks, they are not in the position to effectively manage the banks. Therefore, the status of the governments in the bank corporate governance needs to be determined in a way to assist the financial regulatory reform in the United States as well as in Europe.
V. A GLOBAL STRUCTURAL REGULATION?
A.
Convergence in Financial Regulation
Since the 1980s, national corporate governance systems have been the focus of numerous academic studies. Good corporate governance law and practice were believed to be competitive forces not only for individual firms, but also for national economies. Comparative corporate law studies 213 and convergence theories 214 gained much attention accordingly. Now, it is about time to (re)focus on financial regulatory systems of the world in terms of competition and convergence. As Bernard Black did suggest it for comparative corporate governance studies, 215 many of the core problems of financial regulatory system are universal, and, accordingly, the range of reasonable solutions may be finite. Universal banking and its regulatory issues need to be studied seriously in order to understand the origins of structural differences of financial markets and financial services industries. Comparative financial system and regulation must regain its importance in academia and practice. As Adam Pritchard puts it, regulation on big banks will converge over time, but jurisdictional competition for hedge funds will be one of the most important topics in the future. 216 We need to know whether different structures achieve distinct level of performance and the structural differences are the sole result of different regulatory attitudes. 217 The efficiency and (international) competitiveness of financial institutions are an inherent part of any country's development strategy. Economies of scale and scope are the primary goal of the banking business as it is in other businesses. Big banks and universal banks are an attractive model, including to bank managers, shareholders and employees; but ironically, big banks and universal banks can create systemic risk easier than smaller and specialized banks. It can ruin the entire economy. This is the dilemma most governments face. It is part of the tensions between regulation and competition that can never be resolved once and for all as Davies and Green put it. 218 The solutions are different as the economic and political situations are different, but at the same time, no financial system is isolated from others. Convergence and persistence will be an important topic in this area in the coming years. Comparative financial system study, 219 therefore, may benefit the evolution of international financial regulation. 220 The Volcker-Rule may set the direction for international guidelines for the structure of doing banking business also outside the United States as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 did in international corporate governance. 221 Although governments will differ in opinions in respect of the substance of the Volcker-Rule, they will not have serious problem on agreeing on the core proposition behind the Volcker-Rule that the commercial banking activities of a universal bank should not stray too far from their central mission of serving their customers. Such guidelines may well shape the structure of large international banks' businesses in future. Corporate governance of financial institutions may be a good starting point.
B. Allocation of Regulatory Authority
To be sure, it is hard to foresee whether a meaningful international regulatory arrangement could be made. It will not be easy to create international rules for the business structure and conduct of financial institutions. Governments have incentives to cooperate with other governments but only to the extent that they achieve their own policy goals. Nevertheless, incentives to cooperate on the global level are far greater than so far due to the severity of the financial crisis, the stage of global integration of financial markets, 223 and the activities of financial institutions. Scholars have emphasized the need for ongoing coordination and cooperation between European and U.S. regulators for the effective supervision of financial conglomerates. 224 National financial systems will converge at least for the time being and an international standard will emerge. International supervision and prudential regulations have been proven to be feasible and work well in practice. John Coffee also predicts international convergence in financial regulation supporting the contingent capital alternative. 225 The future of universal banking and big global financial institutions will be determined by such standards. This may be different than it has been in the corporate governance area where formal convergence has been proven most difficult due to various pathdependence-related factors. 226 The approach to the issue of the allocation of regulatory authority approach may arguably cause jurisdictional conflicts 228 and a race to the bottom through competition among governmental bodies. The Dodd-Frank Act grants U.S. courts jurisdiction to hear securities actions brought by the SEC or the Justice Department that involve extraterritorial elements. 229 Also, as indicated above, the Dodd-Frank Act could operate along similar lines to the SarbanesOxley Act's effects on international corporate governance. For example, Section 173 of the Dodd-Frank Act stipulates access guidelines to the U.S. financial market by foreign firms. The SEC is authorized to refuse to register foreign brokers that present a risk to the U.S. financial system and have a home country that has not adopted or progressed toward adopting financial regulation to mitigate that risk. David Skeel points to the provision as an attempt to force harmonization of international financial regulation. 230 The speculation is that the provision aims to force other countries to put regulatory structures similar to the Dodd-Frank Act in place, or face with consequences against their own firms.
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C. The Role of the Basel Committee
The approach is not productive. The Unites States, and any other state in the world, should not use foreign firms, either listed on its stock exchange or doing business within the state, in its foreign policy enforcement. If the United States wants to achieve harmonization, it should do so through an international forum and/or international rule-making agency. The substance of the Volcker-Rule can be housed in an international rule to be effectively disseminated to outside of the United States.
Convergence in the regulation of financial institutions can be achieved through voluntary, not forced, harmonization. The European Union has been successful in harmonizing national standards in capital markets law The IOSCO has also been doing excellent works on creating centralized set of minimum standards in the securities regulation. Convergence in bank corporate governance is not the product of forced harmonization and therefore amenable to international rules. Financial regulations should follow suit. 234 it can also be instrumental in creating the international rules for the structure of banking businesses. The Basel Committee already has excellent track records in making and implementing the prudential rules. Its rules are well complied even by non-member states of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) due to their nature as soft law. 235 As the Committee itself states, it is "best known for its international standards on capital adequacy; the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision; and the Concordat on cross-border banking supervision." 236 The author once suggested that the BIS rules greatly influenced corporate governance of Korean companies through the involvement of the International Monetary Fund in the regulatory reform process in Korea after the Asian financial crisis of 1997. 237 If the Committee promulgates relevant rules for the structure of banking business, the rule may have strong normative power through similar mechanism.
EU securities market).
Again, if member states are still not ready to accept such an approach, the Committee may expand and strengthen the power of prudential rules and improve the bank corporate governance.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This Article reviewed the historical background of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 along with the developments in the markets that led to the GLBA. It analyzed the discussions on the Volcker Rule in the Dodd-Frank Act in terms of the reinstatement of the Glass-Steagall Act from a comparative perspective. Many countries developed the plan for moving toward the universal banking system that has been prevalent in Europe and the United States since the enactment of the GLBA. This Article concludes that the developments and discussions in the United States have been shaped largely through politics in the United States then and now. The United States once separated commercial banking and investment banking for political reasons. The separation was abandoned for economic reasons, and partially restored again for largely political reasons. The whole process was uniquely American. To support the argument, this Article looked into the situation in Europe, in particular in Germany and Switzerland; however, this Article generally agrees with the proposition that the commercial banking activities of a universal bank should not stray too far from their central mission of serving their customers, and proposes that international rules for the business structure and conduct of financial institutions including the proposition could be possible. Convergence in bank corporate governance is a good indication for one in financial regulation.
Transatlantic differences in the financial system and structure of banking business can be attributed to political and historical factors. Banks are under the strong influence of the history and politics of their states of origin and places of business, and their strategy is determined by such factors. However, the practices and strategies of financial institutions in the United States and Europe seem to converge toward each other. The U.S. financial institutions have been pursuing the European universal banking model ever since the Glass-Steagall Act was enacted. European universal banks have been expanding into the investment banking business through aggressive acquisitions as well as organic growth. Over time, two sides of the Atlantic may look much alike as far as the structure of banking business is concerned. It seems that the global financial crisis has contributed to the trend. Now it is time for legal reform to follow the developments in practices. To maintain current levels of standards of living, we need to keep financial complexity as it is today 239 and develop the regulatory sophistication by which the global economy could benefit from the financial services on the global scale.
